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A B S T R A C T 
We survey the literature on the effects of public sector outsourcing. Guided by theory, we 
systematically  arrange  services  according  to  the  type  and  magnitude  of  their 
contractibility  problems.  Taken  as  a  whole,  the  empirical  literature  indicates  that 
public sector outsourcing generally reduces costs without hurting quality. This is clearly the 
case for “perfectly contractible services” like garbage collection, but outsourcing often seems 
to work reasonably well also for some services with more difficult contracting problems, e.g. 
fire protection and prisons. Outsourcing seems to be more problematic for credence goods, 
with residential youth care as the prime example. In contrast to previous reviews, we conclude 
that ownership and competition appear to be about equally important for the consequences of 
public sector outsourcing.  
 
JEL classification: D23, H11, L33 
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1. Introduction 
 
How does outsourcing influence the cost and quality of public services? In this 
paper we review the literature on public sector outsourcing with a focus on ownership, 
competition, quality and contracting. On the theoretical side, we investigate how 
ownership has been modeled − and how it may interact with competition and 
contracting imperfections. Guided by theory, we then systematically arrange public 
services according to the type and magnitude of their contractibility problems and 
review the empirical literature according to this arrangement. We identify a gap 
between the theoretical and the empirical literature. While most of the theoretical 
literature (e.g. Hart et al., 1997) has focused on issues of ownership, the empirical 
literature has mainly emphasized the effect of competition.    
Public sector outsourcing is an important phenomenon internationally. Public 
procurement accounts for approximately 15 percent of world output (Lewis and Bajari 
2010). The average OECD government is outsourcing 42 percent of the costs of goods 
and services. While the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan are 
outsourcing a large portion (between 50 and 60 percent) of government production, 
the governments of Mexico and Greece have chosen to produce most goods and 
services themselves (with outsourcing shares between 20 and 30 percent). Since 1995, 
several countries, including the Netherlands, Spain, and the United States have seen 
an increase in production costs in the public sector together with a decrease in the 
share of goods and services produced by government employees.
1 
While economic research on outsourcing public services has been reviewed 
before – most closely related to our work are Domberger and Jensen (1997), Grout 
and Stevens (2003), and Jensen and Stonecash (2005) – we set out to provide a review 
that offers a number of distinctive elements.
2 An important element is a stronger 
emphasis on the economic theory of ownership, competition, and contracting. This 
emphasis is manifest both in an effort to take stock of theoretical work directly in 
                                                 
1 OECD (2009, p. 62). 
2 Domberger and Jensen (1997) is an early paper that insightfully synthesizes theory – albeit less 
formally than we do – and evidence; it provides, e.g. a useful overview of considerations about 
ownership in outsourcing arrangements. Grout and Stevens (2003) also provide a rather informal 
account of theory in an encompassing review of the financing and delivery of public services, with 
some emphasis on the “Private Financing Initiative” in the UK. Jensen and Stonecash (2005) provide a 
thorough discussion of some important but little-discussed issues such as the potential redistribution 
following outsourcing arrangements.   3 
appraising the virtues of different arrangements, and in an effort to consistently assess 
evidence through the lens provided by theory, stressing the paramount role played by 
contractibility. Finally, we pick up a large number of more recent empirical studies. 
This is important for three reasons. First, we can include studies of prisons and 
residential youth care – two services that seem to be quite difficult to contract on. 
Second, since many of the early studies focused on time periods when competition 
was first introduced, there is a risk that the effects of outsourcing, and especially 
effects working via mechanisms of competition, have been overestimated. Third, the 
empirical literature has gradually moved towards more credible identification 
strategies and much of this development was not possible to capture at the time when 
previous reviews were written. 
As to demarcations, we do not systematically address the issues stemming from 
quasi markets and voucher systems; in particular, we do not deal with school choice. 
In the same vein, we do not discuss corruption and its implications for public-service 
contracting. 
As a consequence of our reliance on theory, the question about the relative 
importance of private ownership vs. competition for the outcomes of outsourcing is 
discussed at some length. We argue that previous conclusions in favor of competition 
ought to be further qualified. In particular, the effects of competition are more 
complex and difficult to capture than previous studies have been willing to assume. 
Some of the largest competition effects are found in studies of the introduction of 
competition, whereas the effects of ownership are relatively large in later studies.   
Another expression of our adherence to theory is found in our treatment of 
quality. As emphasized by Hart et al. (1997) private producers are often able to reduce 
costs, but given typical incompleteness of contracts also have incentives to shirk on 
quality. We discuss the contractual underpinnings of this and stress that empirical 
work should seek quality indicators that are distinct from contracted measures of 
quality.  
In the following we will devote the next section to reviewing important 
theoretical work on ownership and competition, deferring most of the discussion 
about their direct relevance for outsourcing public services to Section 3, where we 
also try to sort out the relationship between ownership, competition, and contracting. 
In Section 4 we present and discuss empirical evidence, and in Section 5 we conclude.  
   4 
 
2. Ownership and Competition 
 
2.1 Ownership 
While the notions of ownership and property rights are canonical within 
economics, their conceptualization have been unsatisfactory in so far that the 
implications of ownership as modeled have seemed less profound than implications of 
ownership seem to be in practice. The main reason for this is that ownership can be 
completely neutralized by means of contracts as long as the assumption of complete 
contracting is maintained. The assumption of complete contracting proved, moreover, 
to be hard to relax in a tractable way for a long time.
3  
The “property-rights approach” to firm boundaries pioneered by Grossman and 
Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) was a major breakthrough in this regard. The 
property-rights framework combines two key assumptions: 
  a seemingly weak form of assumed contractual incompleteness – the existence 
of unforeseen contingencies that require renegotiation of a contract at 
delivery, and 
  the notion of “residual control rights” defining ownership of an asset by the 
decision rights over its use under circumstances not covered by contractual 
obligations.  
With these assumptions, any contractual relationship will lead to bargaining 
over the ultimate surplus in renegotiation; the residual control rights will be important 
since they determine outside options in this renegotiation. The framework thus, 
arguably, germanely captures the way in which ownership provides leverage in 
contractual relations in practice.  
The standard property-rights model, accessibly presented in Hart (1995), 
considers a setting where parties make relationship-specific investments prior to trade. 
                                                 
3 The logic is very similar to that of the first welfare theorem, and it has been illuminated by e.g. 
Sappington and Stiglitz (1987). They assert that absent distortions and imperfections, a private firm can 
be controlled by a government/regulator equally well as a publicly run firm (implying that privatization 
cannot hurt); they then assess requisite conditions for this to hold or not to hold. Williamson (1985) 
provides a different angle by asserting that a government/regulator can run a firm as well as a private 
owner and on top of that make selective interventions to promote social welfare (implying that public 
control can be no worse); he too assesses requisite conditions for this to hold or not to hold.   5 
The specificity is manifest in the investments being more valuable if trade takes place 
than if outside options are exercised; assets to which these investments are tied are 
called specific assets. The payoff from outside options – which co-determines 
investment incentives – depends on asset ownership, and by this channel the level of 
relationship-specific investments depends on asset ownership.  
The property-rights approach has been applied to service contracting in an 
influential paper by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) (HSV in the following).
4 This 
paper provides a model that is close in spirit to the standard property-rights model but 
tailored to a contracting-out context.  
To get a fuller insight into the workings – and the pros and cons – of the 
property-rights approach we will sketch the mechanics of the model. There are two 
actors, the manager, M, who runs the facility that may be subject to contracting, and 
the government represented by a bureaucrat, G. M runs the facility either as an 
employee “warden” who does not own the facility, or as an independent contractor 
who owns the facility. The bureaucrat’s objectives are aligned with those of the 
government, and M is self-interested.  
The key assumptions about the technology are that there is a reference way of 
managing the facility, the attainment of which can be contractually enforced, and that 
the manager can modify the operations by making two kinds of investments: 
  an investment in finding out improvements or innovations in the way the 
facility is operated;  
  an investment in finding out measures to reduce costs with potentially 
negative repercussions on the operations and on the bureaucrat.  
The distinction between the regimes stems from the residual rights of control 
over the facility which is manifest in the manager’s power to implement the outcome 
of the investments. The employed manager needs permission from the bureaucrat to 
implement any investment (since the government retains residual control rights over 
the asset), the independent contractor on the other hand can implement cost-
reductions without permission while still needing permission to implement 
                                                 
4 Schmidt (1996) applies an incomplete-contracting framework to show how the assumption that the 
government has more information about a public firm leads to a rent-extraction problem for 
intervention in a private firm (due to private information); this is bad in terms of allocative efficiency, 
but good in terms of ex ante productive efficiency.    6 
improvements and innovations (since the government as the buyer can accept or reject 
offers to upgrade quality with an accompanying cost increase). A crucial assumption – 
stemming from contractual incompleteness – is that in order to implement the 
investments that need permission, the contract is renegotiated. In renegotiation, the 
surplus from the activity subject to renegotiation is split equally between the parties. 
The main conclusion from the HSV model are that costs are lower when M is an 
independent contractor while quality – affected by improvement and innovation as 
well as the pursuit of cost-cutting – may be either higher or lower in that case. Thus, 
private production is superior when the deterioration of quality from cost reduction is 
sufficiently small relative to the importance of improvements and innovation.  
The notion of ownership in terms of residual control rights in the presence of 
contractual incompleteness is intuitive, and the related fact that investment incentives 
arise naturally thanks to the dynamics of the model is an additional strength of the 
property-rights framework. The prediction that contracting out likely produces 
reduced costs while the effects on quality are ambiguous is consistent with 
conventional wisdom; we will review the evidence in this regard below. On the other 
hand it is important to point out that the fact that contracts are always renegotiated 
makes it hard to think of incentive contracts – contracts specifying remuneration as a 
function of performance measures – within this framework; the practical importance 
of incentive contracts makes this a significant drawback. Finally, the HSV model does 
not deal with (ex post) competition, the topic which we now turn to.  
 
2.2 Competition 
The notion of competition is at the core of modern economics, and the basic 
definition and conceptualization of it seem both uncontroversial and congruent with 
the popular notion of competition. At the most fundamental level, competition among 
potential providers serves the dual purpose of confining the provision of the service to 
those best suited for providing it, and to transfer a sizable fraction of the surplus 
generated by the provision to the buyers; the former is a selection mechanism favoring 
more efficient producers while the latter is a mechanism entailing effort and 
redistribution of rents.  
In terms of the textbook classification of market competition, oligopoly is the 
case most relevant in our context. In oligopoly, the exact nature of strategic 
interaction can make a big difference. A useful benchmark is the Bertrand model of   7 
price competition. In its simplest form it generates the prediction that firms with 
identical constant marginal cost will compete fiercely and that price will be equal to 
marginal cost; with repeated interaction or heterogeneity, this conclusion is 
overturned. Another result within the framework is that product differentiation 
attenuates competition; this conclusion is important and also quite robust.
5  
While standard oligopoly models can be placed in repeated settings – making 
them amenable to analysis by means of repeated games – this literature has been less 
successful in approaching truly dynamic interaction where firms may make 
investments and where entry and exit are part of the dynamic game. An important 
consideration here is that the immediate intuition from the theory is that innovation 
incentives seem likely to depend negatively on competition – the less rents there are 
to compete for, the weaker the incentives; this intuition is often associated with 
“Schumpeterian ideas.” Going a step further, this conclusion is not unambiguous; 
depending on the effect of innovation on pre-innovation and post-innovation rents, the 
conclusion might go either way. There are, in fact, reasons to believe that innovation 
is affected by competition by an “inverted-U shaped” relationship, as argued by 
Aghion et al. (2005). The basic intuition behind the positive part of the relationship is 
that competition forces some firms to innovate to stay in business.
6 
Although the application of competition to service contracting has been quite 
widespread, there is no single dominant model that has been used. Still, much of 
service contracting is bought/procured on a special kind of marketplace, viz. by 
bidding based on competitive tendering. A bit sloppily, this process can be seen as a 
means of accomplishing price competition that – given that quality is unimportant or 
can be appropriately dealt with – comes close to replicating the “Bertrand outcome” 
with marginal-cost pricing. While a reasonable way of looking at it, there are several 
important qualifications.
7 First, auctions may undermine the mechanisms generated by 
repeated interaction and product differentiation to sustain prices above marginal cost. 
The strict rules and the transparency of the auction process make it more difficult for 
                                                 
5 A similar conclusion can be derived within the monopolistic-competition framework where product 
differentiation is combined with free entry limited by fixed costs; the conclusion there is that the more 
varieties that co-exist in the market, the closer is the market outcome to perfect competition. An 
important general conclusion is that inefficient firms may well survive in oligopolistic markets thanks 
to prices being kept high enough. 
6 Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) and Alesina et al. (2005) show that regulatory reforms that stimulate 
competition are positively related to multifactor productivity and investment. 
7 The basic observations about auctions can be accessibly found in Klemperer (1999).    8 
firms to engage in tacit collusion.
8 As to differentiation, it can be neutralized in so far 
that if relevant qualities can be fully specified, price competition can take place 
conditional on those qualities. Secondly, however, the auction process also by 
construction leads to the key decision (bidding) being made under incomplete 
information about competitors; this incomplete information produces information 
rents reflected e.g. in the property that bidders in first-price sealed-bid auction make 
bids that exceed their true cost (in procurement auctions). This property translates 
directly to other formats by the “revenue equivalence theorem” stating that a broad 
range of auction formats generate the same expected cost for the buyer (Klemperer, 
1999). On a final note Bulow and Klemperer (1996) prove an illustrative result on 
auctions stating that the benefit from attracting an additional bidder to a standard 
auction is higher than the benefit of replacing the auction with an optimally structured 
negotiation with the original set of bidders. One may note that an additional bidder is 
positive both from a selection point of view – the new bidder may be the most 




3. Service contracting 
In this section we will try to spell out the key insights into service contracting 
that are offered by the basic theories of ownership and competition discussed, as well 
as by economics in general. The analysis of outsourcing of public-sector activities is 
closely related to the analysis of the make-vs-buy decision and the literature on the 
boundary of the firm.
10  
 
3.1 Contractibility and quality  
Contracting and contracting possibilities play a crucial role in the context of 
outsourcing, not least in the context of ascertaining quality. To make the distinction 
clear, one may consider a four-step ladder of possibilities for contracting on a 
                                                 
8 This, obviously, does not mean that collusion is ruled out; Klemperer (2002) goes through a number 
of examples of sophisticated collusion practices.  
9 In the English auction considered, this is manifest in the probability that the new bidder is the runner-
up and thereby determines the price. 
10 The property-rights approach – with its roots in transaction-cost economics – has developed from this 
inquiry; see Hart (1995) for a general introduction. A key observation is the importance of specific 
assets in explaining integration/outsourcing choices; this insight is corroborated in HSV (1997).   9 
variable, X, that can be thought of as relevant quality. In each case we mention 
illustrative examples discussed further in Section 4. 
1.  If X can be specified in a contract, and the contract can be enforced at 
negligible cost – i.e. if a deviation can be identified by a court or arbitrator and 
an appropriate sanction can be applied – the variable is said to be perfectly 
contractible. Garbage-collection services seem to provide an example where 
this is reasonably close to being true.  
2.  If an imperfect measure of X can be contracted on, the quality provision 
problem suffers from moral hazard. Road maintenance and transportation 
exemplify this below – in both cases quality indicators, such as punctuality in 
transportation, provide garbled measures of exerted effort.  
3.  It may be that the parties to a relationship all know X, but this knowledge is 
not “hard” enough to be the basis for an enforceable contract. The variable is 
then said to be observable but unverifiable; this is precisely the assumption 
made about investments in the property-rights framework described above. 
This feature is often present when there is personal interaction between the 
provider and clients or customers, such as in employment placement services.  
4.  Finally, it may be that only the service provider knows X; the good with 
quality X is then said to be a credence good. Residential youth care provides 
an example where crucial quality aspects have this property.  
The possibilities are ordered down the ladder in the sense that empirically, 
credence goods necessarily entail elements of lack of verifiability and moral hazard, 
and it is hard to think of an outsourcing context with severe verifiability issues in the 
absence of moral hazard.
11  
We will stress the theoretical considerations that come with moral hazard, and 
then we will get back to verifiability and credence goods. A general observation is 
that moral-hazard problems as envisioned under 2 can be dealt with by providing 
incentives ex ante; ex post bargaining (or repeated interaction), on the other hand, 
                                                 
11 In purely theoretical terms, cases 2 and 3 are not unambiguously ordered in terms of contracting 
possibilities; there may, for example, exist trading arrangements that can cleverly utilize unverifiable 
information, as noted by Hermalin and Katz (1991), but such ways of eliciting soft information are 
particularly rare in the public sector.    10 
needs to play a role in order to create incentives for unverifiable qualities as in 3. This 
is in line with the dynamic element in the property-rights model as discussed above. 
The basic principal-agent model provides a useful framework for appraising the 
means of ascertaining appropriate action via direct ex ante incentives.
12 There is a 
tension between providing strong incentives for the provision of the desired X and 
other considerations, such as the undesirable risk exposure that comes with 
punishment of a measured outcome that may have come about in spite of the 
underlying behavior being as contracted, or effort substitution as conceptualized by 
the multi-task model.
13 The multi-task model is defined by outcomes and associated 
performance measures having more than one dimension; the outcome of an instance 
of outsourcing, for example, may be characterized by realized cost and quality, each 
with an imperfect performance measure. Under the additional assumption that the 
agent can allocate effort across tasks, it follows under some additional assumptions 
that strong rewards tied to performance in one dimension will make the agent re-
allocate effort at the expense of the other dimension. Since monetary outcomes are, in 
many cases, easier to measure than quality, there is a temptation to reward cost-
savings more strongly than quality; the caveat coming from the multi-task model is 
that this may lead to inefficient effort substitution and unsatisfactory care for quality.  
The multi-task model provides a framework for comparison across activities; 
activities where hard-to-measure qualities are relatively more important should be 
subject to weaker cost-saving incentives. This observation is normatively significant 
but it does not speak directly to trade-offs involving outsourcing; the application to 
outsourcing is nevertheless quite direct in light of the general observation that 
monetary incentives are, in general, stronger in inter-organizational transactions than 
in transactions within an organization. In less formal terms, an independent contractor 
is expected to face stronger cost-saving incentives than would a public-sector manager 
working on the same task. While this fact is often acknowledged and subject to 
analysis in transaction-cost economics – see e.g. Williamson (1985, Ch. 6; 1998) – it 
is more seldom addressed within the formal contracting literature. In recent work, 
Acemoglu et al. (2008) argue that organizations deliberately create free-rider 
                                                 
12 This basic set-up was explored by the early formal literature on the principal-agent problem; two 
influential early contributions are Holmström (1979) and Grossman and Hart (1983).  
13 We will adhere to the framework of Holmström and Milgrom (1991); a different set-up dealing with 
the same basic issues is developed in Baker (1992).    11 
problems to weaken monetary incentives; Andersson (2009) appeals to the property-
rights literature in assuming that residual revenue streams are indivisible and subject 
to incomplete contracting and that outsourcing amounts to transferring residual 
monetary incentives to the provider.
14 A simple observation in the same spirit is that if 
a principal has attenuated monetary incentives, such incentives will be passed on to 
the agent; there is a “trickle-down property” in incentive provision. This can 
illuminate e.g. the observation that managers in non-profit firms have, in general, 
weaker monetary incentives than managers in comparable for-profit firms.
15 
In dealing with verifiability issues, a fundamental insight of transaction-cost 
economics and the property-rights approach is the importance of ownership. When 
unverifiable payoffs are tied to an asset, the owner has appropriate incentives without 
a need for contracting. While the analysis of ex-ante specific investment is an integral 
part of the standard model, the relationship between the investment in a physical asset 
and the services produced by means of the asset does not arise. In practice, however, 
the production of many public services – such as care for the elderly, education, 
transport and incarceration – takes place in facilities, the design and maintenance of 
which are important for the costs and quality of the service.  
Outsourcing arrangement involving assets that need maintenance benefit from 
the user of the asset carrying the responsibility for and receiving the residual payoffs 
from its maintenance; this is most simply implemented by having the user own the 
asset. Thus in the context of outsourcing the operation of bus services, ownership of 
the buses should rest with the contractor.
16 The bus example is not fully 
representative, however, since it involves rather non-specific assets. The problem 
constitutes a greater challenge when it comes to specific assets, such as a contractor 
operating a nursing home in a small town; if the contractor owns the nursing home but 
is replaced when the contract is renewed, the re-sale opportunities may be poor, and 
the investment incentives accordingly inefficiently weak. Moreover, in cases where 
assets are specific, the returns to many investments are likely to accrue to both the 
                                                 
14 The novelty in the framework in Andersson (2009) is the combination of this with the existence of a 
fully contractible performance measure that is subject to manipulation by the agent; the model predicts 
that direct incentives are stronger under outsourcing.  
15 This empirical observation is made e.g. in Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999); a simple theoretical 
analysis of incentives in non-profits is Glaeser and Shleifer (2001). 
16 A corroboration of pitfalls and mistakes in contracting of bus services is provided by Sclar (2000, 
Ch. 5).    12 
contractor and the public body. There are thus a number of trade-offs in the optimal 
arrangement of asset ownership. 
The basic intuition above is corroborated by theoretical work on the pros and 
cons of bundling the construction and the management of a facility for provision of 
services. Both Bennett and Iossa (2006) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008) address this 
issue and a conclusion emerging from both papers is that a positive externality of 
effort in the construction on the provision of services favors bundling; a negative 
externality favors separation.
17 One may note that this is perfectly in line with the 
reasoning above in so far that appropriate maintenance seems bound to spill over 
positively on service provision.   
When it comes to credence goods, most theoretical work is concerned with 
direct consumer purchase, and we will not pursue this.
18 Features of credence goods, 
however, highlight the potential importance of public service motivation, viz. the 
notion that some workers have an intrinsic motivation either for work directly or for 
the output generated in service production as surveyed by Francois and Vlassopoulos 
(2008). It is often argued on theoretical grounds that such motivation is more 
prevalent in the public sector and in non-profit organizations; in particular, it is argued 
that a profit-motive unavoidably crowds out such motivation since the residual 
claimant cannot commit not to exploit such motivation. A recent paper by Gregg et al. 
(2011) finds firm evidence that there is a significant difference in the propensity to 
“donate labor” between the for-profit and non-profit (including public) sectors of the 
economy; they also argue that this reflects a selection effect.  
 
3.2 Ownership and competition in service contracting  
The next step is to synthesize the observations made in terms of ownership, 
competition and contracting in a way that ties directly into the empirical analysis. 
First, we will articulate the interaction between ownership and competition in service 
contracting, and then go on to discuss the interaction with contracting issues.  
In Table 1 we sketch the choice set defined by the degree of competition and the 
involvement of private ownership by means of a two-by-two matrix. A key point is 
that relevant options are generally found on the main diagonal. Private monopoly – 
                                                 
17 In the framework of Martimort and Pouyet (2008) this turns out to hold both if there are instruments 
for providing elaborate incentive contracts for construction, and if ownership is the only instrument.  
18 A review of the economics of credence goods is provided by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006).    13 
which in our context of service contracting means offering a no-bid contract to a 
monopolist – is almost unheard of, barring arrangements driven by rightout 
corruption. Competition involving only entities controlled by the public sector is rare 
in practice.  
 
Table 1: Simple classification of cases 













Can competition between publicly owned actors, albeit rarely observed, 
substitute for competition involving privately owned competitors? Clearly, this 
depends on the scale and scope of the market. On a general note, a reason for 
competition between public units to be less powerful is the difficulty for the public 
body responsible to commit to hard budget constraints; any expectation that a failed 
unit would be bailed out – e.g. by a capital injection or by its employees being offered 
similarly-attractive jobs elsewhere – would undermine the incentives to work hard to 
avoid failure.
19 In addition, there is a difference between public and private ownership 
in terms of the option value of a significant success; a private owner can gain 
substantially from a drastically improving innovation, whereas such incentives are 
much weaker within the public sector.
20 On the other hand, any element of choice by 
users would make competition across public-sector units more powerful, as would a 
degree of genuine autonomy across such units. Both these conditions seem to be met 
in the UK National Health Service (NHS), as discussed in Section 4 below.  
                                                 
19 While we have not framed our analysis in terms of “soft budget constraints,” this is another lens 
through which weak direct monetary incentives in government bureaucracies can be understood; see 
Eggleston (2008) for a formal development of soft budget constraints using the property-rights 
framework. 
20 This can also be phrased in terms of expansion incentives; as noted by Hoxby (2003) a distinctive 
element of for-profit schools (compared with non-profits) is the incentive to expand. Competition 
excluding private-sector involvement would be likely to be considerably less fierce for this reason.    14 
A related question is why it is often the case in practice that an activity is 
partially contracted out in the sense that some in-house provision is retained. There 
are a number of reasons for this. First, retaining in-house production can be viewed as 
guaranteeing the presence of an additional competitor and this is likely to discipline 
competition, in particular in light of the fact that in-house competition is unlikely to 
engage in collusive activities. The benefits from additional private-sector competition 
are arguably marginal when the private share of production approaches 100 percent. 
Second, there is some option value for a public body to have the capability to engage 
hands-on in an activity in case of, for instance, a failure of delivery by a contractor, or 
in order to handle residual demand. Third, the practical knowledge of how a particular 
service is produced may improve the chances of outsourcing that service successfully. 
Finally, this may be a way of exploiting public service motivation, with employees 
with strong such motivation sorting themselves into public employment, as 
corroborated by Gregg et al. (2011).  
Two remarks can be made on the above classification:  
  The concentration on the main diagonal distinguishes service contracting from 
privatization of public enterprises; in the latter case the privatization of a 
monopoly is perfectly possible (although it raises questions about regulation).  
  The conclusion that the introduction of private ownership and competition go 
together does not per se change the fact that different forces are set to work; 
therefore there remains the empirical task of assessing their relative 
importance.  
In the absence of further complications in the form of contracting issues and 
challenges in finding appropriate ownership structures, the case would be closed; the 
economic argument for introducing private ownership and competition would be 
unambiguous. Such complications, however, are obviously important in practice. The 
incentives for compromising quality through effort substitution are clearly 
strengthened by the appropriability of cost-savings coming with private ownership. 
As to the effect of competition on effort-substitution incentives, there is a clear 
distinction between: 
  the effects on contracted quality – where effort-substitution incentives are 
eliminated by construction in contracting – and,    15 
  the effects on post-contracting performance where effort-substitution 
incentives exist and are likely to be somewhat strengthened by the fact that 
rents are competed away.  
Focusing on contracting and quality, the important overall point is that 
movement towards the involvement of private ownership and the introduction of 
competition calls for an endogenous response in terms of contracting arrangements; in 
particular, it calls for a heavier reliance on contracting. This creates an incentive for 
stronger monitoring and better measurement of quality and overall performance. This, 
in turn, has a clear implication in terms of service contracting:  
  The better the prospects for contracting based on appropriate performance 
measures, the more attractive are arrangements involving private ownership 
and competition.
21  
This observation gives a clear theoretical prediction for the success of service 
contracting. It gives, moreover, scope for a theoretical analysis of movement along the 
main diagonal in Table 1 based on an assessment of such characteristics in each case.  
 
 
4. Empirical Evidence 
 
The empirical literature on public sector outsourcing is voluminous and there 
are a great number of recent contributions. Already in 1996, the Australian Industry 
Commission reviewed 203 international studies. In this section, we take stock of the 
empirical literature, primarily in economics, of the consequence of outsourcing public 
services. In doing this, we systematically group the services into the four groups 
discussed in Section 3 with different kinds of contractibility problems and also rank 
the services along a one-dimensional assessment of their contracting difficulty.     
After the pioneering cross-sectional studies in the 1970s and 1980s, the 
empirical literature has gradually moved to studies based on panel data and more 
                                                 
21 This statement may be subject to a general criticism often raised against transaction-cost reasoning, 
namely that by focusing on conditions for private-ownership and competition to be attractive, it is not 
truly comparative. In this context, however, the (absolute) attractiveness of monopolized public 
provision can reasonably be assumed to be less sensitive to the contracting characteristics stressed in 
the statement.    16 
credible identification strategies. Accounting for more recent studies is also important 
since the effects of outsourcing are likely to be the largest when the public sector is 
first opened up for competition. The 1980s may have been a period when unusually 
large benefits from outsourcing could be reaped. We find the empirical literature to be 
consistent with this presumption. While the earlier literature singled out competition, 
later studies give about equal weight to ownership and competition as explanations of 
the effects of outsourcing. The development in many countries towards more public 
sector outsourcing has thus increased the relevance of the theoretical literature with its 
focus on ownership and the “property-rights approach”.        
Empirical investigations of the effects of outsourcing face several 
methodological problems which should be characterized before reviewing the 
empirical papers. The comparability of public and private units is perhaps the most 
obvious one. In a study of the privatization of Czech companies, Gupta et al. (2008) 
show that more profitable companies were privatized first in order to maximize state 
revenue and to improve the goodwill of the extensive privatization program. Studies 
of outsourcing face similar selection problems. An important advantage of public 
sector outsourcing – compared with uncontested public production – is the ability to 
choose between production units with different characteristics. One should expect 
efficient and well-managed firms to be overrepresented when public sector contracts 
are awarded, and the previous studies have not been able to distinguish this selection 
effect of competition from the pure – or average – effect of private ownership.   
Given that most empirical studies have been cross-sectional, omitted variables 
are a major concern. Panel data obviously helps but do not fully solve the problem. 
Services associated with moral hazard problems are particularly troublesome in this 
regard, as the service provider does not fully control the measured outcome. On the 
contrary, estimates for “perfectly contractible” services should be less sensitive to the 
inclusion or omission of certain control variables.   
There are also reasons to expect data availability to be a fundamental problem. 
As to Hart et al (1997), who assume that quality is observable only to the contracting 
parties but not verifiable to outsiders, it follows – in their framework – that the data 
needed to test the quality effects of outsourcing is not readily available to researchers. 
This problem has two manifestations. First, the reason why we will list 14 empirical 
studies of garbage collection and only two on residential youth care probably stems 
from the fact that the outcomes of garbage collection are much easier to study.   17 
Second, while the distinction between contractible and non-contractible measures of 
quality is fundamental in theory, it has not been sufficiently emphasized as a problem 
of data availability in the empirical literature.
22 In consequence, subjective quality 
measures from user surveys seem interesting to analyze as they contain aspects of 
quality that are notoriously difficult to contract on.  
 The measurement of costs poses additional problems of data availability. Sclar 
(2000) critically examines such obstacles and stresses the need to distinguish between 
avoidable and unavoidable costs, and to include all of the transaction costs that a 
contract gives rise to, including the costs stemming from the risk that the contractor 
fails to deliver. Most empirical studies compare contracted payments with costs for in-
house production in a rather nontransparent way (see e.g. the highly cited study by 
Domberger et al. 1995).  Domberger et al. (2002) provide a distinct exception by 
including tendering costs, legal fees, and the ongoing transaction costs associated with 
contract management.  
The empirical literature is still struggling with these problems. The first wave of 
research consisted of cross-sectional studies, and was quite vulnerable to problems of 
selection and misspecification. More recent studies have incorporated additional time 
periods so that changes in outsourcing are observed. But although selection problems 
have been addressed in various ways, no published study has managed to make use of 
plausibly exogenous variation in outsourcing.   
Before we start reviewing the empirical studies it is instructive to briefly 
consider the privatization of state-owned enterprises. While the absence of a 
contractual relationship after such a full-fledged privatization invalidates 
generalizations to public sector outsourcing, there are two reasons why the 
privatization of state-owned enterprises provides useful input to our investigation. 
First, differences between the public sector and private organizations provide a basic 
motive for public sector outsourcing – and such differences are easier to identify in 
cases of complete privatization that also include the financing of the service. Second, 
in the case of perfect contractibility, the outcomes of public sector outsourcing and 
pure asset privatization should be approximately the same, providing a theoretical 
benchmark against which public sector outsourcing can be compared.              
                                                 
22 Propper et al. (2008) compare how easily observed and unmeasured dimensions of quality are 
affected by an increase in competition.     18 
The weight of the evidence suggests that private firms produce goods and 
services more efficiently than state-owned enterprises do. Literature reviews by 
Megginson and Netter (2001), Sheshinski and López-Calva (2003), Megginson 
(2005), as well as more recent empirical work,
23 suggest that the differences are 
attributable both to ownership and to competition. The positive effects of privatization 
on efficiency can be found both on competitive and on less competitive markets. For 
our purposes, the implication is that public sector outsourcing holds the promise of 
improving economic efficiency – in so far as the improvements are not overturned by 
transactions costs, including from the difficulty of contracting.   
 
4.1 Costs and quality 
Numerous studies have examined whether outsourcing has led to reductions in 
costs and public expenditure. There is a consensus that outsourcing reduces costs of 
most public services, although the magnitude of the savings has been debated. Mainly 
relying on the 1996 meta-study by the Australian Industry Commission, Domberger 
and Jensen (1997) conclude that outsourcing may produce savings in the order of 20 
percent without sacrificing service quality. Grout and Stevens (2003) confirm that 
competitive tendering has reduced the costs of several services, notably garbage 
collection and laundry services.  
Among the numerous papers in this literature, we are only aware of a handful of 
papers that report that public sector outsourcing increases costs. Studying Sweden, 
Ohlsson (2003) finds that public garbage collection is 6 percent cheaper than private 
collection.
24 Garbage collection is however the most studied service internationally 
and studies from other countries (US, UK, and the Netherlands) indicate that 
outsourcing reduces costs (see Table 2). Thompson (2011) finds that the average 
school district in Minnesota could cut costs by 20 percent by going from fully private 
to fully public student transportation.
25 Lindqvist (2008) finds that the total cost of 
residential youth care is twice as high in private facilities compared with in-house 
                                                 
23 See e.g. Bartel and Harrison (2005), González-Páramo and Hernández Cos (2005), and Okten and 
Arin (2006).  
24 Using the same data set, Ohlsson (1996) also finds that input prices (of garbage trucks) paid by 
private firms are 10–15 percent lower than the input prices paid by local governments. 
25 Thompson (2011) notes that previous studies of student transportation have produced conflicting 
results. Notably, McGuire and van Cott (1984) find that private school bus transportation is 12 percent 
cheaper. Their study is, however, cross-sectional whereas Thompson has a panel with six school-years 
of data.   19 
production in Swedish municipalities. The higher costs in private facilities are 
interpreted as seller-induced demand. Residential youth care is credence good, 
meaning that the seller has private information on the optimal quality or quantity of 
the buyer, placing it at the fourth step of the ladder of contracting possibilities 
described in section 3.1.    
According to the Hart el al (1997) model, quality may be either higher or lower 
under contracting compared with in-house production by the public sector. Although 
the tested empirical hypothesis has often been labeled “quality shading”, most studies 
find that quality is either unaffected or improved when a public service is contracted 
out. Notable studies include Domberger et al (1995, 2002). The support for quality 
shading is often anecdotal or unsystematic (e.g. Ganley and Grahl 1988). Residential 
youth care is the notable exception. Bayer and Pozen (2005) study juvenile 
correctional facilities in Florida and find that county facilities outperform for-profit 
facilities both in terms of cost and recidivism performance. In a Swedish study, 
Lindqvist (2008) finds that private facilities have lower base line quality than public 
facilities, although public facilities are also found to shun particularly troublesome 
teenagers. For prisons, both Pozen (2003) in a review article and Cabral et al (2010) in 
a recent Brazilian study, conclude that quality is at least as high in private prisons. 
However, two studies of health care in prisons provide mixed evidence. Raimer and 
Stobo (2004) find that several health outcome measures improved after the state of 
Texas implemented a contracting out strategy in the form of a managed health care 
program.
26 Bedard and Frech (2009) on the contrary find that mortality has increased 
in the share of medical personnel employed under contract in US state prisons.
27
   
The HSV model (in its Proposition 5) predicts that quality may be higher or 
lower under private ownership. To test that part of the model, one has to focus on the 
mechanisms underlying the ambiguous effect on quality. Relative to public 
production, the model predicts that quality under private production will be higher the 
more sensitive quality is to efforts to improve quality (which is hard to test) and lower 
the more sensitive it is to cost cutting efforts (which arguably depends on the 
contractibility of quality). Thus, it is suggestive to test if quality is higher under 
                                                 
26 The improved outcome measures included blood sugar levels in diabetics, the proportion of inmates 
with high blood pressure, and death rates from AIDS and asthma. 
27 By including health care among prison services we assume that health care is an integral part of the 
provision prison services that is (sufficiently) different from ordinary health care outside of prisons.    20 
private ownership relative to public ownership, the easier it is to contract on quality. 
This, moreover, is an implication both of the HSV model and (under some plausible 
additional assumptions) the multitask contracting model.  
Table 2 compares the effects on cost and quality of outsourcing services with 
different contracting difficulties. We divide the services into the four groups of 
contractibility presented in section 3.1 (perfect contractibility, moral hazard, 
unverifiability, and credence goods). In addition to this grouping, we assign an ordinal 
measure of contracting difficulty to each service. This measure is based on the city 
manager survey of Levin and Tadelis (2010), supplemented with our own judgment 
for services excluded in their survey. The measure of contracting difficulty confirms 
our claim in section 3.1 that the four groups of contractibility can be ranked according 
to such a measure.       
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Table 2. Contracting difficulty and the cost and quality effects of outsourcing 




Cost and quality effects of outsourcing  References 
Garbage collection  Perfect 
contractability 
Very small
a  Cost savings without loss of quality  Savas (1977); Stevens (1978); Domberger et al (1986, 
1988); Cubbin et al (1987); Ganley and Grahl (1988); 
Szymanski & Wilkins (1993); Ohlsson (1996); 
Szymanski (1996); Bosch et al. (2000); Gomez-Lobo 
& Szymanski (2001); Dijkgraaf & Gradus (2003); 







b  Significant cost savings (24%) and 
satisfactory quality 





Small or very 
small
c 
Cost savings whilst at least maintaining 
ex post quality 
Domberger et al. (1987); Milne & McGee (1992); 
Domberger et al. (1995); Milne & Wright (2004); 
Christoffersen et al. (2007) 
Road maintenance  Moral hazard  Small
d  Cost savings (a 10% increase in private 
involvement leads to a 2% expenditure 
reduction) without loss of quality. 
Blom-Hansen (2003) 
Student transportation  Moral hazard  Small or 
intermediate
c 
Conflicting results. In-house production 
cheaper in the only panel study. No 
reliable quality measure. 
McGuire & van Cott (1984); Thompson (2011) 
Employment placement  Moral hazard, 
unverifiable 
Intermediate
c  Unemployed clients more satisfied with 
private placement agencies, but no 
difference in labor market outcomes in 
the aggregate (private placement 
agencies are better for immigrants but 
may be worse for adolescents).  
Bennmarker et al. (2009) 
Fire protection  Moral hazard, 
unverifiable 
High
e  Private production cheaper, strikingly so 
for a professional service with full time 
firemen. Strict state regulation makes 
Ahlbrandt (1973); Kristensen (1983)   22 
quality of public and private fire 
protection very similar in Denmark. 
Prisons  Unverifiable and 
moral hazard 
Very high
f  Cost savings and mixed findings on 
quality effects 
Pozen (2003); Bedard & Frech (2009); Cabral et al 
(2010) 




g  Costs increase and quality decrease  Bayer & Pozen (2005); Lindqvist (2008) 
Notes: 
a According to the city manager survey of Levin and Tadelis, there are only two services with (marginally) less contracting difficulty than residential solid waste 
collection (viz. operation of parking lots and garages and utility meter reading). Contracting difficulty in the Levin and Tadelis survey ranges from -1.29 (least difficult, rank 
29) for operation of parking lots and garages to 2.08 (most difficult, rank 1) for crime prevention/patrol.  
b The contracting difficulty of buildings and grounds maintenance is -1.08 (rank 23 of 29) according to the city manager survey of Levin and Tadelis. 
c Our own judgment. 
d The contracting difficulty of street repair is -0.31 (rank 17 of 29) according to the city manager survey of Levin and Tadelis. 
e The contracting difficulty of Fire prevention is 1.41 (rank 4 of 29) according to the city manager survey of Levin and Tadelis. 
f Not measured by Levin and Tadelis but comparable to the two services that are most difficult to contract out according to their city manager survey (crime prevention/patrol 
and drug and alcohol treatment programs). 
g Not measured by Levin and Tadelis but comparable to the service that is second to most difficult to contract out according to their city manager survey (drug and alcohol 
treatment programs).   23 
Table 2 demonstrates that there appears to be no tradeoff between cost savings and 
quality for services with small contracting difficulties (garbage collection, vehicle and 
warehousing maintenance, cleaning and housekeeping, road maintenance, and student 
transportation). Garbage collection – characterized as perfectly contractible and very 
small contracting difficulty – is by far the most studied service. The empirical studies are 
concordant and demonstrate that outsourcing of garbage collection reduces costs without 
loss of quality.
28 The evidence is mixed for the costs of student transportation (for which 
reliable quality data has been unavailable). A Swedish study of employment placement 
by Bennmarker et al. (2009) is particularly interesting in that it applies random selection 
of unemployed persons to private or public placement agencies. The study finds that 
unemployed clients are more satisfied with private placement agencies, but that there is 
no difference in labor market outcomes in the aggregate between these two forms of 
agencies. However, the treatment effects seem to be heterogeneous: private placement 
agencies produce better outcomes for immigrants but may be worse for adolescents. 
Unfortunately the study does not compare the costs of public and private placement 
agencies. 
For services that are difficult to contract on (fire protection, prisons and residential 
youth care), the picture is different. Outsourcing reduces costs of fire protection and 
prisons but increases costs in residential youth care. For quality, outsourcing seems to 
have a detrimental effect in residential youth care, whereas the evidence for prisons is 
mixed (although outsourcing seems to increase prison quality on balance). One of the two 
studies on fire protection (Kristensen 1983) deals with Denmark where strict state 
regulation makes quality of public and private fire protection very similar. The other 
study on fire protection (Ahlbrandt 1973) deals with Arizona and controls for but does 
not report quality differences.  
 
4.2 Ownership and competition 
Separating the effects of ownership and competition has been a central problem in 
the empirical literature. Previous reviews (Domberger and Jensen 1997; Grout and 
                                                 
28 The exceptions are the Swedish study by Ohlsson (2003) and the critical comment on Domberger et al. 
(1986) by Ganley and Grahl (1988).   24 
Stevens 2003; Jensen and Stonecash 2005) conclude that competition is the more 
important of the two. The general argument is that private ownership becomes 
problematic when competition is lacking. However, given that competition and private 
ownership are often introduced in tandem, their individual effects are quite difficult to 
disentangle. In fact, there are no empirical studies that have managed to identify both the 
ownership effect and the two competition effects of selection and effort.   
Following Domberger et al. (1986), the empirical strategy for discriminating 
between the effects of ownership and competition has been to study services that are put 
up to tender but retained in-house. Since ownership remains public, cheaper in-house 
production after a tendering process has been interpreted as an effect of competition. The 
difference between private producers and public in-house production is then interpreted 
as the ownership effect. The problem with this interpretation is that the selection effect of 
competition will be included in the estimated ownership effect.  As Ohlsson (2003) notes, 
public procurers prefer firms run by high ability managers, and the benefits from 
contracting with well-managed firms should not be attributed to private firms in general.  
Importantly, the effect of introducing outsourcing in the public sector may be 
different from the effect of increasing it further. Several of the empirical studies deal with 
occasions when the public sector was first opened up for competition (notably the early 
UK studies, including Domberger et al., 1986, and Cubbin et al., 1987). To start with, it is 
intuitive to expect the selection effect of competition to be largest when outsourcing is 
first introduced. The largest effect of competition could occur as a one-shot effect when a 
public sector monopoly is first challenged by competitors.
29 To the contrary, in occasions 
where a large share of public services is contracted out, one should not expect a large 
competition effect from increased outsourcing. Increasing outsourcing from high levels 
will if anything reduce competition if one competitor (the public sector) disappears. Since 
the effect of ownership should stay the same as the contracted share increases, variation 
around high levels of outsourcing could be used to identify the ownership effect. The 
empirical studies have, however, concentrated on cases where the initial level of 
outsourcing is quite low.  
                                                 
29 Adopting the concept of contestability (Baumol et al. 1982) to public sector outsourcing provides a 
reason for a large effect of competition already when the introduction of private providers is seriously 
considered.     25 
Arguably, competition could become problematic when private ownership is 
lacking (suggesting that there is an interaction effect between the two). Competition 
between public units may not result in the same outcomes as competition involving 
private companies. Therefore, competition between public units only is of particular 
interest. The UK National Health System (NHS) has proved a suitable testing ground of 
competition between public units. So far the results are partly conflicting. Propper et al. 
(2008) combine policy changes with geographic prerequisites of competition. They find 
that between 1991 and 1999 competition increased heart attack mortality rates but 
decreased waiting times (which are more visible and easy to measure). However, Gaynor 
et al (2010) study a later policy reform in 2006 aimed at promoting competition between 
hospitals. Their difference-in-differences estimates indicate that competition saves lives 
without raising costs.
30 Bloom et al. (2010) use electoral competition (share of 
government-controlled marginal districts) as an instrument for the number of local 
hospitals (i.e. competition) and find that competition between neighboring public 
hospitals in the UK strengthens management quality and reduces heart attack mortality 
rates. 
A final empirical concern is that the gains from outsourcing are with few 
exceptions based on comparisons between contracted payments and costs for in-house 
production, which means that they are designed to capture one effect of competition (the 
effect on effort rather than that on selection). From a theoretical point of view, private 
ownership, together with the selection effect, create strong incentives for productive 
efficiency (producing at minimum cost), while competition is also a means of promoting 
allocative efficiency (which requires that the consumers’ valuation of goods and services 
equals production costs) and ascertaining that a substantial fraction of the surplus can be 
appropriated by the buyer. If there is an ownership effect, private costs should be lower 
than public costs, regardless whether this translates into higher profits or lower prices. 
Table 3 and 4 collect and regroup the studies from Table 2 that compare the cost 
effects of ownership and competition in a contracting setting, with the addition of one 
study of privatization competitions undertaken by the U.S. Department of Defense 
                                                 
30 Specifically, they find that patients discharged from hospitals located in markets where competition was 
more feasible were less likely to die, had shorter length of stay and were treated at the same cost.   26 
(Snyder et al. 2001).
31 Table 3 contains a chronological collection of cross-sectional 
studies and Table 4 of studies with repeated observations of outsourcing. The reader 
should keep in mind that the selection effect of competition is not included in these 
studies. 
 
Table 3. Cross-sectional studies of ownership and competition 
Study  Sample  Method  Findings 
Stevens (1978)  Garbage collection 
in US cities 
Compare cost 





Private monopoly less 
costly than competitive 
market and also less costly 
than public monopolies in 





1988), Ganley and 
Grahl (1988)   
Garbage collection 





services and for 
services tendered but 
retained in-house. 
The introduction of 
competition is critical for 
achieving lower costs. 
Small additional benefit of 
private ownership. 
However, no comparison 
between ownership and 
competition is included in 
the reply (Domberger et al 
1988) to the critique of 




Domestic services  




services and for 
services tendered but 
retained in-house. 
Both competition and 
ownership matters. But 
implausibly large initial 
savings for private 
contracts suggest “loss 
leading” and make the 
comparison difficult.  
Domberger, Hall & Li 
(1995) 
Cleaning service 




(price and quality). 
Indirect and weak 
evidence that competition 
matters more than 
                                                 
31 The scope of the services in this study implies that it does not fit into the structure of Table 2.   27 
hospitals in Sydney. 
6 quality inspections 
for each contract. 
Small subsamples. 
Dummies for public 
and private 




Dijkgraaf & Gradus 
(2003) 
Garbage collection 
in 85 Dutch 
municipalities 
Estimate different 




for outside collection 
and outside private 
collection. 
Competition (outside vs 
inside provision) is more 
important than the 
ownership of the collection 
service. 
Dijkgraaf & Gradus 
(2007) 
Garbage collection 
in 453 Dutch 
municipalities 
Estimate cost 
function and use 
Herfindahl index and 
C3-ratio to capture 
competition. 




(competition) is more 
important than ownership. 
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Table 4. Studies of ownership and competition with repeated observations  
Study  Sample  Method  Findings 
Szymanski & Wilkins 
(1993) 
Garbage collection in 
England and Wales, 
panel 1984-88. 
Quality of data 
declining over time. 
Only a few 
observations were 
tendered but retained 
in-house. 
Cost regressions. Yearly 
cross-sections with 
Heckman’s correction 
for sample selection, 
pooled cross-sections, 
and panel with fixed 






contracting out and 
tendered but kept in house 
is unstable and statistically 
insignificant. Still, the 
overall impression is that 
competition is more 
important than ownership.  
Szymanski (1996)  Garbage collection 
in England and 
Wales, panel 1984-
94 (update of data in 
Szymanski & Wilkins 
(1993), from 1988 
when compulsory 
competitive tendering 
(CCT) was introduced. 
Pooled cross-sections 
and panel regression 
with fixed authority and 
year effects. Dummies 
for privately 
contracted services 
and for services 
tendered but retained 
in-house. 
Both ownership and 
competition matters and 
are about equally 
important. 
Snyder et al. (2001)  All 3548 
privatization 
competitions 
undertaken by U.S. 
Department of 
Defense 1978-94  
Reduced form model 
with multiple nested 
levels to handle 
censoring and 
selection 
Savings arise both from 
ownership and from 
competition. The share 
from competition was 24% 
(but amounts to 64% of 
potential savings).   
Milne & Wright (2004)  Cleaning services. 
Balanced panel of 
176 hospitals from 
1986-87 to 1990-91 
(880 observations). 
Fixed effects model. 
Use “invitations-to-
tender” as instrument 
for number of bids. 
Both competition and 
ownership matter. Slightly 
larger effect of competition.  
 
Turning to the empirical findings, Table 3 and 4 show that it is primarily in cross-
sectional studies that the effect of competition dominates that of ownership (when it   29 
comes to cost savings for the studied services). This conclusion is hard to maintain in 
studies that are based on panel data. Among the panel studies in Table 4, competition is 
most important in the earliest study with notable data problems (Szymanski and Wilkins 
1993). Studies with a time dimension rather seem to indicate that ownership and 
competition are about as important. Needless to say, this difference could be due to the 
well known problem of omitted variables in cross-sectional studies. However, it could 
also be due to the fact that many of the cross-sectional studies focus on time periods 
when competition was first introduced. While it is only to be expected that competition is 
most important when a monopoly is first contested, the pure ownership effect of 
increased outsourcing should remain after private production have been introduced. This 
difference between competition and ownership has been neglected in the empirical 
studies. It is indeed the case that the largest competition effects are found in studies of the 
introduction of competition (Domberger et al. 1986), whereas the effect of ownership is 
relatively large in the longer panel studies (Szymanski 1996; Snyder et al. 2001). 
We conclude that the claims in previous reviews that competition dominates 
ownership cannot be maintained. Given the problems in existing empirical work it is hard 
to go beyond the conclusion that both competition and ownership matter and seem to be 
about as important for the outcomes of public sector outsourcing. More empirical work is 
needed to qualify this conclusion.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In line with the property-rights framework, ownership appears to be more important 
for the effects of public sector outsourcing than previous empirical reviews have 
concluded. In many countries moreover, the effects of ownership are more relevant today 
when the public sector has already been opened up for competition. Still, competition 
appears to be about as important as ownership for outsourcing outcomes, but has not been 
included in theoretical models of public sector outsourcing, as noted by Snyder et al. 
(2001). The HSV model, for instance, does not have much to say about competition. 
In our review of theoretical work, we stressed the property-rights framework for 
understanding ownership, and the importance of contractibility issues for deeper insights 
into the pros and cons of contracting arrangements. We share with much of the literature   30 
on outsourcing public services some asymmetry in the treatment of contracting with 
private actors on the one hand, and in-house production on the other. It seems desirable 
for the literature generally to invest more in the understanding of the internal workings of 
public-sector bodies.
32 
When presenting the consequences of outsourcing separately for services with 
different contracting difficulties, we documented quite favorable outcomes in terms of 
both costs and quality for many services, although public sector outsourcing appears 
particularly problematic for credence goods, with residential youth care as the prime 
example.  
Our review has identified several dimensions in which there is room for 
improvement in future studies. To start with, the fact that no published study has been 
able to make use of exogenous variation in outsourcing is perhaps not surprising given 
the nature of the choice under study; nevertheless it remains a major weakness of the 
empirical findings. It would also be valuable to compare the costs in private and in public 
production (rather than to compare private prices and public costs). In doing this, the 
studies should also be more transparent about how the costs in private and public 
production have been computed. The inherent difficulty of measuring outcomes that are 
difficult to contract on should be given more attention and in so far that measured quality 
coincides with contracted quality, this should be acknowledged; to the extent that it is 
possible to measure dimensions of quality that are difficult to contract on, this should be 




   
                                                 
32 See Prendergast (2003) for a step in this direction.    31 
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